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HARRINGTON V. RICHTER:  
AEDPA DEFERENCE AND THE 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
KARA DUFFLE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Harrington v. Richter,1 the Supreme Court will interpret the 
AEDPA2 in light of two great bulwarks against injustice for criminal 
defendants: habeas corpus and the constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel.3 The Court will determine what degree of 
deference, under the AEDPA, federal courts must grant to state-court 
summary dispositions in considering petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus. The Court then will proceed to the merits of Respondent 
Joshua Richter’s habeas claim to determine whether the Ninth Circuit 
incorrectly, and impermissibly, enlarged the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.4 
II. FACTS 
On December 19, 1994, Richter and his co-defendant Christian 
Branscombe were visiting Joshua “Gunner” Johnson at his home.5 At 
around 2:30 AM, after smoking marijuana and cleaning Branscombe’s 
gun, Richter and Branscombe left.6 Patrick Klein, a friend of 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Lisa 
Griffin and Christopher Ford for their invaluable help in writing this commentary. 
 1. Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2010). 
 2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010)). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (09-587). 
 6. Id. 
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Johnson’s, decided to spend the night.7 At trial, the State of California 
and Richter presented “dramatically different accounts” of the events 
that followed.8 
The State, according to testimony by Johnson, argued that 
Johnson awoke to find Richter and Branscombe in his bedroom 
attempting to steal his gun safe.9 Branscombe then shot Johnson twice, 
wounding him.10 A short time later, Johnson heard shots in the living 
room and found Klein bleeding on the couch.11 His gun safe, .380 
caliber M-12, and $6,000 in cash were missing.12 
In contrast, Richter said that upon returning to Johnson’s to drop 
off some belongings, he waited in the truck while Klein let 
Branscombe into the house.13 Shortly thereafter, Richter heard 
gunshots and entered the house to find Klein lying in a pool of blood 
in the doorway, Johnson wounded, and Branscombe “totally freaked 
out.”14 Branscombe was shouting, “[t]hey tried to kill me.”15 Richter 
argued that Johnson fired first, accidentally hitting Klein, and that 
Branscombe responded in self-defense.16 
At some point after the shootings, Johnson called 911 and the 
police arrived to find him “hysterical” and bloody.17 Klein was “near 
death” on top of a sleeping bag on the couch.18 Police uncovered two 
casings in the bedroom, a large pool of blood in the doorway, more 
casings near the couch, and blood throughout the house.19 Police 
deemed this evidence consistent with Johnson’s story and did not 
conduct an in-depth forensic investigation.20 
After the trial had already started, the State conducted forensic 
tests and called two forensic experts to testify.21 A blood spatter expert 
stated that it was unlikely that Klein had been killed in the doorway 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 947–48. 
 13. Id. at 948. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 948–49. 
 20. Id. at 949. 
 21. Id. at 950. 
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and later carried to the couch.22 A serologist tested blood from spatter 
above the doorway and testified that it did not match Klein’s blood 
type.23 The defense did not call or consult with forensic experts.24 
The jury convicted Richter and Branscombe of murder, attempted 
murder, robbery, and burglary.25 The California Court of Appeal 
affirmed the convictions and the California Supreme Court denied 
petitions for review and for habeas relief.26 The District Court for the 
Eastern District of California then rejected Richter’s federal habeas 
petition, a decision affirmed by a panel of the Ninth Circuit.27 Sitting 
en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial 
and remanded with directions to grant Richter’s habeas petition.28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In his petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the California 
Supreme Court and the federal district court, Richter argued that he 
had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel.29 When, as here, a district court considers a habeas petition 
that originated in state court, it must address the additional 
obligations set forth in section 2254(d) of the AEDPA.30 
A. The AEDPA 
If a prisoner believes his conviction was obtained in violation of 
the United States Constitution, the exhaustion of state appeals “need 
not be the end of the road.”31 Through the writ of habeas corpus, he 
may petition for relief in federal court.32 The goal of habeas corpus is 
to ensure the “fundamental fairness of the state adjudication.”33 As 
Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent in Frank v. Mangum,34 “[h]abeas 
corpus . . . cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 947. 
 26. Id. at 950. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 969. 
 29. Id. at 952. 
 30. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010). 
 31. Gregory J. O’Meara, “You Can’t Get There From Here?”: Ineffective Assistance Claims 
in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545, 550 (2009). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). 
 34. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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structure . . . and although every form may have been preserved, 
opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty 
shell.”35 
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen36 broadened the 
scope of habeas review by mandating that state-court decisions 
rejecting the federal constitutional claims of state prisoners receive de 
novo review.37 In 1996, however, Congress passed the AEDPA, raising 
the level of deference accorded to state-court decisions and insulating 
them from federal scrutiny.38 The relevant statutory provision, section 
2254(d), provides that an application for habeas “shall not be 
granted” for any claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” unless the 
state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law” or was “based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts.”39 
The AEDPA was enacted to address the interests “of comity, 
finality, and federalism.”40 Specifically, “Congress wished to curb 
delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to give effect to 
state convictions to the extent possible under law.”41 By making it 
more difficult for a federal court to grant a habeas petition that 
originated in a state court, the AEDPA altered the relationship of 
those courts.42 De novo review, as required under Brown, implies a 
level of skepticism about whether state courts can adequately decide 
federal constitutional issues,43 whereas the AEDPA adopts the 
presumption that “state courts know and follow the law.”44 
When federal courts consider unreasoned state-court decisions,45 
the relationship between federal and state courts is further 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
 37. Id. at 546. 
 38. Ezra Spilke, Adjudicated on the Merits?: Why the AEDPA Requires State Courts to 
Exhibit Their Reasoning, 39 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 995, 1003 (2006). 
 39. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010). 
 40. E.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003)). 
 41. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000). 
 42. See O’Meara, supra note 31, at 555 (“The strength of the writ of habeas corpus depends 
in large part on how easily petitioners can get into court. AEDPA seemed to make access to 
federal court difficult.”). 
 43. Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer To That Which Did Not Exist”: AEDPA Meets 
the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (2002). 
 44. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). 
 45. An “unreasoned” decision would be a summary disposition that provides no signal or 
explanation as to how it was decided. 
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complicated by the statutory requirement that the claim be 
“adjudicated on the merits.”46 In Ylst v. Nunnemaker,47 the Supreme 
Court authorized federal courts to “look through” the unexplained 
order to an earlier reasoned state-court judgment, based on the 
presumption that the decisions “rest upon the same ground.”48 The 
Court stated that “[t]he essence of unexplained orders is that they say 
nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no effect . . . 
most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.”49 
The Court has not yet answered the question of what federal courts 
are to do when no such earlier reasoned judgment exists. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Strickland v. Washington 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”50 In Strickland v. Washington,51 
the Court fleshed out this right and laid down the current standard for 
constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.52 The Court 
stated that “[t]he right to counsel plays a crucial role in the 
adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment”53 and that the 
“benchmark . . . must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined 
the proper functioning of [that] process that the trial cannot be relied 
on as having produced a just result.”54 
Strickland requires that a criminal defendant meet a two-pronged 
test.55 The defendant must prove that (1) counsel’s performance was 
deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.56 
This standard, which is no more specific than “reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms,”57 was meant to be “highly deferential” 
to defense counsel.58 To meet the performance prong, counsel’s 
failures must be so severe that he was not “functioning as the 
 
 46. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010). 
 47. Ylst v, Nunnemaker, 537 U.S. 797 (1991). 
 48. Id. at 803. 
 49. Id. at 804. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 51. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 685. 
 54. Id. at 686. 
 55. Id. at 687. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 688. 
 58. Id. at 689. 
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‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”59 To 
meet the prejudice prong, the defendant must have been deprived of 
a fair trial.60 The test accounts for the fact that there are “countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.”61 
Beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases—
Williams v. Taylor,62 Wiggins v. Smith,63 and Rompilla v. Beard64—that 
enlarged the scope of the right to effective counsel by requiring “far 
more robust investigation.”65 In each of these capital cases, the 
Supreme Court found that the defendant’s counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to reasonably investigate possible 
avenues of defense. In Williams, the Court invalidated the conviction 
because counsel “failed to discover a treasure trove of mitigating 
evidence”66 that might have “influenced the jury’s appraisal of [the 
defendant’s] moral culpability.”67 In Wiggins, counsel knew of the 
defendant’s troubling history yet failed to follow up on leads 
regarding that history.68 The Court found that this was not a strategic 
decision because without adequate investigation “counsel w[as] not in 
a position to make a reasonable strategic choice . . . .”69 Finally, in 
Rompilla, counsel failed to investigate an aggravating factor on which 
the prosecution intended to rely.70 Though noting that counsel need 
not “look[] for a needle in a haystack, when a lawyer has reason to 
doubt there is any needle there,”71 the Court nevertheless expanded 
 
 59. Id. at 687. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 689. 
 62. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 63. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 64. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 65. O’Meara, supra note 31, at 575. 
 66. Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 527 
(2009). 
 67. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398. In Williams, the defendant was “borderline mentally 
retarded” and had suffered severe mistreatment, abuse, and neglect as a child, all of which his 
attorney had failed to investigate and present. Furthermore, the same experts that testified on 
the State’s behalf later admitted that in a controlled environment the defendant would not pose 
a risk of future harm. Id. at 370–71. 
 68. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535. In Wiggins, the defendant had a traumatic childhood that 
included physical and sexual abuse, being left at home for days with no food, and being raped 
and molested while in foster care, all of which counsel failed to reasonably investigate and 
present at trial. Id. at 517. 
 69. Id. at 536. 
 70. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385–86. In Rompilla, counsel failed to thoroughly investigate 
signs of the defendant’s troubled childhood, mental illness, and alcoholism. Counsel failed to 
look at the defendant’s prior conviction file, which the State had and planned to use against the 
defendant. Id. at 390. 
 71. Id. at 389. 
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Strickland by requiring defense attorneys to look at the entire case 
and “all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits . . . .”72 
In 2009, however, the Supreme Court halted the growth of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine with its rejection of the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Knowles v. Mirzayance.73 In Knowles, the 
Ninth Circuit held counsel’s performance deficient because he failed 
to present an insanity defense when he had “nothing to lose.”74 The 
Supreme Court refused to adopt the “nothing to lose” standard and 
noted that “this Court has never required defense counsel to pursue 
every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic 
chance of success.”75 Even without the “doubly deferential” review 
under the AEDPA, the Court stated, the claim would still fail.76 
IV. HOLDING 
In Richter v. Hickman, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
courts’ decision and held that Richter’s counsel violated the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.77 The court began by quoting Sun Tzu78 
on the virtues of preparedness,79 condemning Richter’s counsel for 
behaving most unlike a Boy Scout.80 Judge Reinhardt, writing for the 
majority, stated that counsel’s lack of preparation resulted in 
ineffective representation and, as a result, the trial court unreasonably 
applied Strickland.81 The majority stated that counsel behaved 
unreasonably in failing to investigate the availability of forensic 
evidence and to consult forensic experts regarding a central issue in  
 
 72. Id. at 387. 
 73. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1413 (2009) (holding that “Mirzayance failed 
to establish that his counsel’s performance was ineffective . . . “). 
 74. Id. at 1417. 
 75. Id. at 1420. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (09-587). 
 78. Sun Tzu is a famous Chinese philosopher who is best known for writing THE ART OF 
WAR. 
 79. Richter, 578 F.3d at 946 (“To . . . not prepare is the greatest of crimes; to be prepared 
beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues.” (quoting SUN TZU, THE ART OF 
WAR 83 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford University Press 1963))). 
 80. See Boy Scout Motto, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (Aug. 5, 2007), http://usscouts.org/ 
advance/boyscout/bsmotto.asp (“Be Prepared.”). 
 81. The majority proceeded to an analysis of the merits and dismissed the issue of AEDPA 
deference, noting that it would grant the writ under either a de novo or objective 
unreasonableness standard of review. Richter, 578 F.3d. at 951 n.5. 
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the case.82 The holding revolves around the understanding that 
adequate investigation is at “the heart of an effective defense.”83 
Under Strickland’s first prong, the performance prong, the 
majority stated that counsel failed in his duty to Richter in three ways. 
Counsel failed to (1) investigate prior to choosing a trial strategy; (2) 
investigate available corroborating forensic evidence during trial 
preparation; and (3) consult experts during the trial to counter the 
State’s sudden introduction of damaging expert testimony.84 The 
majority reasoned that although state courts have a generous amount 
of latitude in applying the Sixth Amendment’s protections, “[w]e do 
not . . . afford [them] a blank check to determine, at their whim, 
whether an attorney’s conduct was reasonable or unreasonable.”85 
Because counsel provided no reasoned explanation for his failure 
to investigate, the majority rejected the argument that counsel’s 
decision was strategic.86 It distinguished the case from Knowles, where 
counsel was well-informed, and analogized it to Wiggins, in which the 
Court held that counsel could not be well-informed without 
adequately investigating his client’s history.87 The majority also 
rejected the argument that counsel’s failure was reasonable because 
he was “hamstrung by the element of surprise,” stating that he should 
have investigated before the trial began and not only in response to 
the State’s use of experts.88 The majority cautioned, however, that this 
holding would not require counsel to seek expert advice on every 
conceivable issue89 or at “every stage of the proceedings,”90 but only 
where the issue is of central importance. 
Continuing to Strickland’s prejudice prong, the majority held that 
Richter’s counsel prejudiced his client by failing to introduce blood-
spatter evidence.91 A subsequent investigation by Richter’s new 
counsel revealed expert testimony from a reliable source that directly 
contradicted the State’s version of events.92 The testimony would 
seriously reduce Richter’s culpability and would discredit Johnson, 
 
 82. Id. at 953–54. 
 83. Id. at 946. 
 84. Id. at 954. 
 85. Id. at 952. 
 86. Id. at 958. 
 87. Id. at 959. 
 88. Id. at 957. 
 89. Id. at 954 n.7. 
 90. Id. at 954 n.8 (quoting id. at 970 (Bybee, J., dissenting)). 
 91. Id. at 966. 
 92. Id. at 963. 
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the State’s key witness.93 Furthermore, the majority noted that 
counsel’s failures did not go unnoticed by the State, who mocked the 
defense counsel during closing arguments.94 
On February 22, 2010, the Supreme Court granted the State’s 
petition for writ of certiorari regarding whether the Ninth Circuit 
“impermissibly enlarged” the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel.95 In addition, the Court directed the parties to brief the 
question: “Does AEDPA deference apply to a state court’s summary 
disposition of a claim, including a claim under Strickland v. 
Washington?”96 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. The Scope of the AEDPA’s “Adjudicated on the Merits” Clause 
The State argued that AEDPA deference applies to the 
unreasoned summary disposition because of state court practices, the 
plain language of section 2254(d), and the need to protect the 
interests of federalism and efficiency.97 First, the State argued that 
under well-established state-court precedent an unexplained decision 
rejecting a habeas petition is a ruling on the merits.98 The State relied 
on In re Robbins,99 stating that if a California court invokes a 
procedural bar as a basis for denying relief, it will cite to that 
procedural default in its order.100 The California Supreme Court did 
not do so here. 
Second, the State argued that the plain language of the statute 
does not require an explained ruling, noting that Congress 
presumably knew that unexplained decisions are common in state and 
federal habeas litigation.101 Under section 2254(d), the State 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 962 (“I am not going to worry about Jill Spriggs . . . because, hey, her seven years 
as a biochemist and a criminalist, and the fact that she went to college to learn this stuff doesn’t 
mean anything, because I am a lawyer . . . . I am not going to pay and bring in an expert to show 
you . . . . I am a lawyer. I can do it.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587 (U.S. Nov. 9, 
2009). 
 96. Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506, 1507 (U.S. Feb. 22. 2010) (No. 09-587). 
 97. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 17, Harrington, No. 09-587 (U.S. May 10, 2010). 
 98. Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits at 4–5, Harrington, No. 09-587 (U.S. Aug. 23, 
2010). 
 99. In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311 (Cal. 1998). 
 100. Id. at 340. 
 101. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 24–27. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2011  10:05:00 AM 
2011] AEDPA DEFERENCE AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 63 
articulated that it is the ultimate decision that matters and not the 
reasoning.102 To suggest that AEDPA deference requires a reasoned 
decision would “necessarily require adding language to an 
unambiguous statute—no less one that is part of a detailed and 
comprehensive statutory scheme.”103 
Finally, the State argued that the purposes for which the AEDPA 
had been enacted would be frustrated if summary dispositions do not 
warrant AEDPA deference.104 Nearly 20,000 criminal habeas petitions 
are decided in California each year,105 and “this Court has recognized 
that it has ‘no power to tell state courts how they must write their 
opinions.’”106 To deny deference when, for efficiency reasons or 
otherwise, a state-court decision is unexplained would “imply, 
unjustifiably, that these adjudications are not well-reasoned and are 
the product of a dereliction of judicial duty.”107 
Richter, in contrast, argued that the summary disposition should 
not trigger AEDPA deference because of California’s “peculiar” 
scheme of summary denials, the necessity of adjudicating on both 
Strickland prongs, and the fact that sections 2254(d)(1) and (2) 
require some analysis of the state court’s reasoning.108 First, California 
has four distinct types of summary dispositions.109 State courts may 
deny a petition by stating that it is “on the merits”110; by citing a 
procedural default111; and by relying on a combination of merits-based 
and procedural reasons.112 Courts can also, as here, issue a “silent 
denial” when “a majority of the state court has not reached a 
consensus as to whether the reasons for denying a petition are merits-
based or procedural.”113 In light of this scheme, Richter argued that 
had the California Supreme Court intended the order to be an 
adjudication on the merits it could have stated that intention, as it had 
with at least five other cases that were reviewed on the same day.114 
 
 102. Id. at 23. 
 103. Id. at 27. 
 104. Id. at 28. 
 105. Id. at 29. 
 106. Id. at 28 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 739 (1991)). 
 107. Id. at 30. 
 108. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, Harrington, 09-587 (U.S. Jul. 9, 2010). 
 109. Id. at 12. 
 110. Id. at 20. 
 111. Id. at 21. 
 112. Id. at 22. 
 113. Id. at 12–13. 
 114. Id. at 26. 
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Richter also noted that the State, in a brief for another case, adopted 
this very argument: “[D]etermining what this particular summary 
order meant was impossible because the seven members of the state 
court may ‘not themselves have agreed upon its rationale, so that the 
basis of the decision is not merely undiscoverable but nonexistent.’”115 
Second, Richter argued that in cases raising Strickland claims, 
AEDPA deference to unreasoned decisions is an “end run around the 
state’s burden” to prove that both prongs were adjudicated on the 
merits.116 Richter asserted that, “[r]equiring the state to prove what 
has actually been adjudicated on the merits is a minimal burden for 
the state to meet in order to get the considerable benefits of section 
2254(d).”117 
Finally, Richter argued that sections 2254(d)(1) and (2), which 
provide mechanisms to prove that the AEDPA does not bar habeas 
relief,118 require some analysis of the state court’s reasoning.119 The 
state court’s decision must be reached “through application of the 
correct law to appropriately determined facts.”120 As Amicus Curiae 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argued, “[w]here 
the state court’s decision fails to provide the information necessary . . . 
the process Congress designed for determining the availability of 
deferential treatment cannot be carried out.”121 Richter claimed that if 
unreasoned decisions are granted AEDPA deference, state courts will 
have a perverse incentive to “say nothing at all” and thereby avoid 
scrutiny.122 
B. What is “Reasonable” under Strickland v. Washington? 
Regarding the merits of Richter’s claim, the State argued that the 
Ninth Circuit incorrectly held that the state court was unreasonable 
and that it impermissibly enlarged the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective counsel.123 The State characterized the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
 115. Id. at 28 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 24, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006) (No. 
04-721)). 
 116. Id. at 13–14. 
 117. Id. at 39. 
 118. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010). 
 119. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 40. 
 120. Amicus Curiae Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support 
of Respondent at 3, Harrington v. Richter, 09-587 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2010). 
 121. Id. at 2. 
 122. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 14. 
 123. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 52. 
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holding as one that requires counsel to consult with or produce expert 
testimony “regardless [of] whether counsel could reasonably conclude 
that such investigation would not be promising . . . .”124 The State 
reasoned that although Sun Tzu’s exhortation on preparedness is 
worthy of aspiration, it is not the law and does not take into account 
the demands and constraints of our judicial system.125 Here, Richter’s 
counsel faced a “daunting” job and reasonably executed his chosen 
strategy.126 As the State articulated, “it was reasonable under 
Strickland. It need not have satisfied Sun Tzu.”127 
The State claimed that counsel’s actions were not deficient 
enough to overcome the “strong presumption” of reasonableness 
under the first Strickland prong.128 The State argued that the choice of 
strategy—attacking the credibility of the drug-dealing survivor and 
exploiting the deficiencies in the police investigation—ought to be 
protected as a product of reasonable professional judgment.129 
Counsel faced overwhelming evidence of Richter’s guilt,130 and to 
limit the investigation of the blood evidence was reasonable when it 
could have been harmful.131 Furthermore, though counsel did not call 
expert witnesses to rebut the State’s mid-trial presentation of expert 
testimony, he did “cross-examin[e] them to good effect.”132 Counsel 
originally, and reasonably, believed the case to be a credibility contest, 
and later was hampered by denied motions for continuance following 
the State’s introduction of expert testimony.133 
Under the second Strickland prong, the State argued that the issue 
of the blood pool was not “crucial to the defense case.”134 In addition, 
Richter’s experts, who did not address the most important forensic 
evidence, would not be able to overcome the “compelling physical 
evidence that tied Richter directly to the crimes[.]”135 Thus, even if 
counsel had been deficient, it would not have affected the outcome.136 
 
 124. Id. at 53–54. 
 125. Id. at 56. 
 126. Id. at 39. 
 127. Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 98, at 19. 
 128. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 52. 
 129. Id. at 39 
 130. Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 98, at 17. 
 131. Id. at 19. 
 132. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 39. 
 133. Id. at 46. 
 134. Id. at 47. 
 135. Id. at 51. 
 136. Id at 47. 
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Richter, in contrast, argued that counsel’s performance was so 
deficient as to be unreasonable, using much of the same reasoning as 
the Ninth Circuit.137 Richter claimed, consistent with Wiggins, that the 
Sixth Amendment protects a defendant from counsel who fails to 
investigate the theory of the defense that he selected, called his client 
to support, and relied on in both opening and closing.138 Richter 
rejected the idea that relying on cross-examination was a reasonable 
alternative to presenting affirmative evidence because counsel’s 
failure to consult with experts left him uninformed and unprepared 
for questioning.139 
Richter claimed that these failures were prejudicial because in a 
credibility contest any defense attorney “worth his salt” would 
investigate available affirmative evidence to bolster the witness’ 
credibility on a central issue in the case.140 Presenting expert testimony 
to directly contradict the State could have persuaded the jury to 
decide that issue in the Richter’s favor.141 
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION 
Regarding the initial question of AEDPA deference, the Court 
likely will decide that summary dispositions are “adjudicated on the 
merits” when it is clear that the decision was made on substantive, 
rather than procedural, grounds. This would require no more than a 
brief signal to federal courts rather than a full opinion or analysis. The 
Court likely will not want to undermine the common practices of 
state courts to summarily deny habeas petitions, particularly given the 
interests of efficiency and simplicity.142 Thus the Court will adopt the 
 
 137. See supra Part IV (arguing that counsel was unreasonable in failing to adequately 
investigate and prepare for a strategy he selected and noting the importance of the new 
evidence, particularly in regard to its role in corroborating Richter’s testimony). 
 138. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 48. 
 139. Id. at 52. 
 140. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Harrington, No. 09-587 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010). 
 141. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 50–60. 
 142. See Brief of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–7, Harrington v. Richter, 09-587 (U.S. 
May 17, 2010) (providing statistics for the widespread use of summary dispositions in state 
courts and illustrating that it is a common practice in habeas litigation to deny a petition 
summarily and without reason); but see Brief of Law Professors and Legal Scholars as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1–2, Harrington, 09-587 (U.S. Jul. 16, 2010) (arguing that 
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view, held by several circuits, that the “adjudicated on the merits” 
clause is focused on the ultimate decision and not on the process.143 As 
the Second Circuit stated, “we are determining the reasonableness of 
the state courts’ ‘decision,’ . . . not grading their papers.”144 This 
interpretation is in line with the principles of federalism145 and judicial 
administrability,146 for which the AEDPA was enacted because it will 
promote the efficient disposition of habeas petitions without the 
threat of relitigation in federal court. 
The Court likely will not extend AEDPA deference, however, to 
instances where the state court has been silent. During oral 
arguments, the justices struggled to determine what exactly the 
California Supreme Court’s “silent denial” was meant to 
communicate.147 As the Court said in Ylst, “[t]he problem we face 
arises . . . because many formulary orders are not meant to convey 
anything as to the reason for the decision. Attributing a reason is 
therefore both difficult and artificial.”148 Similarly, in Fortini v. 
Murphy,149 the First Circuit noted the “frustrating impossibility”150 that 
surrounds silent denials in habeas litigation: “AEDPA imposes a 
requirement of deference to state-court decisions, but we can hardly 
defer to the state court on an issue that the state court did not 
address.”151 By holding that AEDPA deference is not warranted for 
“silent” denials that are issued without indication of a basis for the 
decision, the Court likely will establish a clear rule that eliminates  
 
 
although summary dispositions are common, many states require some form of explanation or 
reasoning). 
 143. See Maura Caffrey, Untying the Knot: A Solution for Confusion in Federal Habeas 
Review of Pennsylvania State Court Capital Convictions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 985, 992 (2009) 
(citing several circuits that support the proposition that AEDPA deference does not require 
discussion). 
 144. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 
 145. See Dennis M. Cariello, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the Values 
of Federalism, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493 (1999) (explaining the core principles of federalism 
and defining federalism as a form of cooperative government that seeks to allocate 
responsibility to either the state or national government depending on which is better suited to 
the task). 
 146. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 28. 
 147. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 55 (“It’s still not clear to me how 
to distinguish that, between denied, deny—do we say, when there’s a one-line order, as in this 
case, where it says simply ‘deny,’ it is presumptively on the merits? I mean, how . . . do we 
interpret that?” (Kennedy, J.)). 
 148. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991). 
 149. Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 150. Wilner, supra note 43, at 1462. 
 151. Fortini, 257 F.3d at 47. 
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much of the confusion and inaccuracy with which courts have applied 
the AEDPA. 
Although such a holding would help to simplify the application of 
the AEDPA by federal courts, a preferable, though extremely 
unlikely, outcome would be for the Court to decide that AEDPA 
deference is triggered only if a state-court decision contains explicit 
reasoning. Such a holding would best protect the fundamental habeas 
right, while providing a clear directive to state courts that the 
disposition of such important cases cannot be merely formulaic.152 In 
Williams, the Court clarified sections 2254(d)(1) and (2) and 
suggested that some analysis of the state court’s reasoning is needed 
to apply the statute.153 Requiring state courts to provide such 
reasoning would advance the judiciary’s interest in accuracy and 
administrability when reviewing state-court habeas cases because 
federal courts would not have to speculate about what facts were 
relied on or which law was applied. Although federal courts would 
still defer to state-court decisions, they would not have to do so 
blindly.154 Habeas corpus is often the final means of relief for a state 
prisoner and deserves reasoned, thoughtful review from at least one 
court.155 
Because the Court will probably find that the denial here was 
silent and does not warrant AEDPA deference, Richter’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim will be reviewed de novo. Even so, the 
Court will likely reiterate the importance of the duty to investigate as 
found in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, but will distinguish this case 
and reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Here, the Court will likely 
 
 152. See Spilke, supra note 38, at 1015 (describing the problems inherent in deferring to 
silent state-court opinions in the habeas context: “Since nothing stops state courts from acting 
arbitrarily, yet silently, the requirement that the claim be adjudicated on the merits before its 
dismissal is granted AEDPA deference is rendered meaningless.”). 
 153. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (“First, a state-court decision involves 
an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies the correct 
governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 
particular state prisoner’s case. Second, a state-court decision also involves an unreasonable 
application of this Court’s precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal 
principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably 
refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.”). 
 154. See Robert D. Sloane, AEDPA’s “Adjudication on the Merits” Requirement: Collateral 
Review, Federalism, and Comity, 28 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 615, 659 (2004) (“It makes little sense to 
circumscribe a federal court’s ability to analyze a federal question based on the absence of a 
state court analysis.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 155. This is not to suggest that state courts would need to write long opinions for each case, 
but that they would be required at a minimum to signal to the petitioner and to federal courts 
under what law and applying which facts the petition was rejected. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2011  10:05:00 AM 
2011] AEDPA DEFERENCE AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 69 
find that, on these facts, the Ninth Circuit has pushed the boundary 
too far.156  
During oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor said “if you are in an 
area . . . where you have no expertise and your case depends on a 
technical issue, it behooves you to at least talk to an expert to find out 
if you are on the right track.”157 Sotomayor’s reasoning, however, is 
unlikely to persuade the Court for a least two reasons. First, the three 
cases that expanded counsel’s duty to investigate were all capital 
cases.158 Richter faces life in prison, and while that is a significant 
punishment, the Court likely will distinguish Richter from a 
defendant facing death row.159 In non-capital cases, it is often 
extremely difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.160 In fact, Strickland has been referred to as the 
“foggy mirror” test: “If you place a mirror in front of defense counsel 
and it fogs, counsel is in fact effective.”161 Here, counsel prepared and 
carried out a strategy, albeit not a winning strategy, that likely will be 
protected against the claim of ineffective assistance. Furthermore, 
even if Richter were to win on the performance prong, the Court is 
unlikely to find prejudice given the weight of evidence against him. 
Second, the Court will strongly consider the administrability of 
stretching the Strickland standard to these facts. The Court will be 
wary of any rule that seems to require consultation with or 
presentation of experts, or that requires affirmative evidence in the 
place of cross-examination. The Court has been reluctant to impose 
 
 156. Notably, of the circuit courts, the Ninth Circuit has the highest rate of reversal by the 
Supreme Court in the past thirty years. Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the 
Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 355, 357 (2006). 
 157. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 17. 
 158. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 159. See Smith, supra note 66, at 535–36 (explaining the expansion of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel doctrine from 2000–2005 as an effort to combat the “politics of death”—
such as the underfunding of indigent capital defense—and the effects they have on the 
administration of the death penalty). 
 160. See Marcus Proctor Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A Comparison of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 13 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 330 (2002) (citing various criticisms of the Strickland test); 
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (“Ten years after the articulation of that 
standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to 
protect a defendant’s right to be represented by something more than ‘a person who happens to 
be a lawyer.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)). 
 161. RANDALL COYNE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, TEACHER’S 
MANUAL 210 (3d ed. 2006). 
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specific rules, instead favoring the independent choices of counsel.162 
Effective assistance of counsel is a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution and stands as a safeguard against injustice, but it must 
work within the constraints and demands of our criminal justice 
system. In Harrington v. Richter, the Court likely will attend to this 
tension by declining to impose strenuous burdens on defense counsel. 
 
 
 162. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (rejecting a rule that failing to file an 
appeal, absent contrary instructions from the client, is per se deficient, favoring a consideration 
of all circumstances); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (explaining that choosing how 
to structure closing arguments is a “core exercise” of counsel’s discretion and that there is a 
strong presumption that those choices are tactical). 
